This paper studies the effect of real effective exchange rate (REER) volatility on economic growth as well as the Euro's effect on REER volatility. We first show that REER volatility is negatively associated with growth in a panel of OECD countries after correcting for potential endogeneity. One standard deviation volatility decrease is associated with 2.1 percentage points (0.8 standard deviations) growth increase. Second, we find that Euro adoption was associated with a decline of 0.4 standard deviations in long-run REER volatility before the Great Recession in 2008-09.
Introduction
There is a long-standing question in international macroeconomics concerning the relationship between real effective exchange rate (REER) volatility and economic growth. Although the large empirical literature on the issue is inconclusive, the survey by Eichengreen (2007) concludes that REER stability is likely to be a facilitating condition for growth. He also notes that the evidence should be interpreted with caution since few studies control for reverse causality from growth to REER stability and many employ a cross-section of countries rather than panel data. Recently Aghion et al. (2009) find that REER volatility is negatively associated with productivity growth in a country panel whenever financial development is below a threshold. Since the authors rely on internal instrumentation to infer causality, however, they have to assume that REER volatility and its interaction with financial development are uncorrelated with future realizations of the error term.
Our goal in this paper is twofold. First, we study the effect of REER volatility on growth using a panel of OECD countries and instrumental variables (IV) estimation to address potential endogeneity. Second, we study the evidence linking the adoption of the Euro to REER volatility. If we find that REER stability is positively related to growth, and the Euro is positively related to REER stability, then the Euro may have played a growth-enhancing role over the sample years. 1 1 Papaioannou and Portes (2008) discuss the potential benefits and costs of the Euro in detail. Apart from increasing REER stability, the Euro may increase international trade, investment and liquidity, provide a new global reserve currency, and decrease and stabilize inflation.
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Our principal findings can be summarized as follows. First, REER volatility is negatively associated with growth in a sample of OECD countries. One standard deviation decrease in volatility is associated with about 2.1 percentage points (or 0.8 standard deviations) growth increase. The estimate contrasts with Aghion el al. (2009) , who find a positive effect on labor productivity only in financially underdeveloped economies. Our second main result is that Euro adoption was associated with a decline of about 0.4 standard deviations in long-run REER volatility before the onset of the Great Recession in 2008-09. Moreover, while the Great Recession increased volatility by 38-189 percent of the sample mean (or 0.4-2 standard deviations) outside the Eurozone, the REERs of Euro adopters were almost completely insulated. We conclude that the Euro may have increased economic growth role by stabilizing the real exchange rates of member countries over the sample years (which admittedly precede the current debt crises in the Euro-zone).
In the remainder of the paper, Section 2 studies the relationship between REER volatility and economic growth. Section 3 reviews the theoretical underpinnings linking Euro adoption to REER stability as well as preliminary evidence linking the two empirically. Section 4 estimates the effect of Euro adoption formally. Section 5 concludes the paper. Most of the data sources and variable definitions are contained in the appendix.
Real Exchange Rate Volatility and Output Growth
In this section we estimate the effect of REER volatility on growth in a panel of OECD countries.
There are several reasons to expect a negative effect. A volatile REER may encourage foreignfinanced spending booms when the exchange rate is high, followed by costly busts due to credit crunches and a rising real value of foreign-currency denominated debt when the exchange rate falls (Calvo et al. 1996) . If busts are costly, the boom-bust dynamic could lower the average growth rate 4 (Martin and Rogers 2000) . The uncertainty associated with volatility may induce firms to postpone irreversible investments (Dixit and Pindyck 1994) and force investors to pay adjustment costs to move across countries or between tradable and non-tradable sectors (Cottani et al. 1990 ). 2 To estimate the effect of REER volatility empirically, however, one should arguably control for reverse causality from growth to REER volatility (e.g., a growth decline might destabilize the REER as foreign capital flees the economy) and other sources of potential endogeneity.
In order to address this concern we rely on instrumental variables (IV) estimation of an annual country panel spanning 1970 to 2009. We measure REER volatility as the standard deviation of country s i' REER over the twelve months of each calendar year. The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of real per-capita GDP. The instrument for REER volatility is the volatility of the commodity terms of trade (CTOT) index used in Aizenman et al. (2012) . We describe this index in the appendix and refer to Aizenman et al. (2012) for further discussion. The volatility of the index is constructed the same way we construct the volatility of the REER, i.e., it is the standard deviation over the twelve months of the calendar year. The empirical growth specification is
where it g is the growth rate of GDP per capita in country i in year t . On the right hand side,
is the lagged value of REER volatility, Crisis is a dummy for the Great Recession 2 Empirically, Cottani et al. (1990) link real exchange rate stability to increased investment and growth in developing countries. Dollar (1992) and Bosworth et al. (1995) link it to growth and Aghion et al. (2009) to productivity growth in financially underdeveloped economies. Ghura and Grennes (1993) and Bleaney and Greenaway (2001) link it positively to investment but find no evidence of a growth effect for sub-Saharan Africa.
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that is equal to one in 2008 and 2009, t is a time trend,
is a vector of other controls, i  is a country fixed effect and it  is an i.i.d. error term. The lagged measure of real exchange rate volatility,
, is estimated in the first stage of the IV procedure using the lagged volatility of the country's commodity terms of trade,
, as instrument. Although in principle IV estimation makes it unnecessary to consider other growth determinants, we also control for the lagged growth rate of TFP in the non-tradables sector relative to the tradables sector, the lagged value of GDP per capita and its square, trade openness, inflation and squared inflation. The first control intends to capture the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect, i.e., the hypothesis that productivity tends to grow faster in the tradables than the non-tradables sector and therefore GDP growth may be correlated with REER appreciation (Rogoff 1996) . 3 The other controls capture the stylized facts that middle income economies, more open economies and economies with moderate inflation tend to grow faster. Income per capita, openness and inflation could also be correlated with REER volatility if high-income countries have a larger non-tradables share in GDP, more open economies are more likely to sustain purchasing power parity due to lack of trade barriers, or inflation destabilizes the nominal exchange rate (Dornbusch 1985 , De Gregorio et al. 1994 , Rogoff 1996 . Tables 1-2 display the summary statistics and sample countries. 
Results

The Euro and REER Stability
Prior to estimating the Euro's effect on REER stability, we briefly consider the theoretical underpinnings linking the two and some simple preliminary evidence. On the theory side, although it may seem obvious that a common currency implies a fixed exchange rate, this conclusion for the Euro would be false for two reasons. First, the Euro only fixes exchange rates within the Euro-zone.
Second, if prices are flexible, the REER can fluctuate despite a common currency. In fact, Berka et al. (2012) take issue with the classical Freidman critique that fixed exchange rates are destabilizing and conclude that (p. 179) "real exchange rates within the eurozone adhere fairly closely to the efficient outcome." Berka and Devereux (2013) similarly find that real exchange rates within the Euro-zone have adjusted substantially towards purchasing power parity via inflation differentials.
In order to link the Euro formally to REER volatility, we use that a Euro country's REER can be written
where countries 1 to M are other Euro countries, countries M+1 to N are Non-Euro countries,
is the domestic currency price level relative to the foreign currency price level of trading 7 partner i , i e is the nominal exchange rate with this trading partner, and i w are bilateral trade weights. 5 In logs,
From (2), the variance of the log REER before the Euro's introduction is
where the first term is the variance of the REER against future Euro members, the second term is the variance against non-members, and the third term is the covariance of REERs viz-and-viz members and non-members. After the Euro-zone is formed, REER variance becomes
using that the relative price levels and nominal exchange rates with respect to all trading partners will change to some 
where the three terms are, respectively, the change in variance against members, the change in variance against non-members, and the change in the covariance term.
Equation (5) shows three effects of introducing the Euro. The first term is the fall in REER variance relative to Euro members due to fixing the nominal exchange rate completely. The second term is a rise in variance if the post-Euro REER relative to non-members is more volatile than its pre-Euro counterpart. For example, with the loss of autonomous monetary policy, Ireland can nolonger stabilize its nominal exchange rate against its largest trading partner, which is the US. As a result Ireland's real Euro-Dollar exchange rate might fluctuate more than its earlier real Pound-Dollar exchange rate. Its overall REER relative to non-Euro members can therefore be more unstable, i.e., the second term in (5) can be positive. The third term can similarly destabilize the REER if, again using the Ireland example, the covariance between the real Pound-Deutschmark and real Pound-Dollar exchange rates before the Euro was smaller than the covariance between the relative Irish-German price level and the real Irish Euro-Dollar exchange rate. For example, if relative price levels are constant in the short run and the Irish Pound used to fall against the Dollar when it rose against the Deutschmark, then the first covariance term in (5) will be close to zero and the second term will tend to be negative. In this case, prior to the Euro Ireland could use the 9 Deutschmark to hedge against Dollar fluctuationsnet exports to Germany might boom when net exports to the US declinedbut the Euro prevented this hedging.
Despite the theoretically ambiguous effect of the Euro, Figure 1 suggests that, in practice, the Euro has stabilized REERS quite significantly. The two curves show REER volatility for Euroand non-Euro adopters from before to after 1999. While the two country groups show similar REER volatility prior to Euro adoption, the Euro members had much more stable REERs subsequently. 6
The volatility differential grew sharply leading up to the Great Recession when, as Figure 2 shows, the real depreciations experienced by non-members were larger by an order of magnitude. When we formally decompose the REER variances of individual Euro members and the Euro-zone overall using equations (3)-(5) we find the results in Tables 4a-4c. Table 4c shows that the Euro-zone average decline in REER volatility after adoption was mostly (57%) due to decreased volatility against other Euro members. However, declining variance against non-members accounted for 17% and less covariance between the REER with members and the REER with non-members accounted for 25% of the total variance decline.
Estimation of the Euro's Effect on REER Volatility
In this section we formally estimate the Euro's effect on REER volatility. Because we have sufficient data available and the REER can show high-frequency movements, we estimate a quarterly rather than annual panel. The quarterly volatility of the REER is computed by first calculating the standard deviation between two months prior and two months after the current month. We, then, take the average variance across the three months of every quarter. Formally 6 The trade weights used to construct the REERs for each country and country group are also displayed in Table 4d 10
where t and s count, respectively, the number of quarters and the number of months in the dataset.
REER volatility has a strong autoregressive component and least squares dummy variables (LSDV) estimates of dynamic panels suffer from bias due to endogeneity among the independent variables (Nickell 1981) . We therefore estimate a random effects model following Hausman and Taylor (1981) and Amemiya & MaCurdy (1986) . The resulting Hausman-Taylor estimators are frequently used in dynamic panel estimation and are explained further in the appendix and Greene (2002) .
Their key advantage is to allow some of the covariates, such as the lagged dependent variable, to be correlated with the unobserved individual-level random effect. 7 The estimating equation is the following:
. ) (
On the right hand side of (7),
is the first-order autoregressive component, Euro represents a dummy equal to one if the country has adopted the Euro and Crisis is a dummy equal to one in Q4: 2008. For robustness we also estimate (7) with two broader crisis definitions, 7 Compared to the Hausman-Taylor approach, a potentially more efficient General Methods of Moments (GMM) procedure for dynamic panels relies on Bond (1991, 1998 
Results
The estimates in Table 5 imply depending on the specification. In stark contrast, the crisis had little or no effect on REER volatility in the Euro-zone: the sum of the coefficients on Crisis and Crisis*Euro is roughly zero. Since we are including country random effects, the positive association between the Euro and REER stability does not reflect that Euro adopters are inherently more resilient to REER fluctuations. These results 12 lead us to conclude that the Euro has stabilized its' members real exchange rates significantly and the effect was particularly large during the Great Recession.
Conclusion
This paper has studied the effect of real effective exchange rate (REER) volatility on economic growth as well as the Euro's effect on REER volatility. We show that REER volatility is negatively associated with growth in a panel of OECD countries after correcting for potential endogeneity using a commodity terms of trade instrument. One standard deviation volatility decrease is associated with a roughly 2.1 percentage point growth increase. We then considered the theoretical underpinnings and some preliminary empirical evidence for the widespread assumption that the 
Consistent and efficient Hausman-Taylor estimators for dynamic panels
To estimate eq. (7) in the main paper we use a model of the form:
where ) 1 (t i y is the dynamic term, The Hausman-Taylor estimation strategy (Hausman and Taylor 1981, Amemiya & MaCurdy 1986) involves an instrumental variable estimator using information provided by the model. The instruments can be extracted from the group mean deviations in the following formulation:
The following three steps in HT ensure finding consistent and efficient estimators of  = ( T is the total number of periods.
Using the estimator s e 2 found above, we can solve for s m 2 . In the third step, we use the previously found consistent estimators for the residual variances to give the structure to feasible generalized . In the final step, we estimate the efficient instrumental variable estimator of (a2)
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